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Book Reviews 
TWO VIEWS ON: 
Ethics at the Edges of Life: 
Medical and Legal Intersections 
Paul Ramsey 
Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1978. xvii + 353 pp. , $15.00. 
An unusually penetrating and deservedly respected voice in contemporary 
theological ethics again brings logic to bear on literally "life and death" choices. 
This work, based on the 1975 Bampton Lectures at Columbia University, includes 
an impressively thorough review and interpretation of pertinent law and public 
policy. Ramsey 's standard of ethical assessment is the principle of equality spec-
ified as care for each human person according to his or her need, rather than merit 
or usefulness (161, 205). He appeals to the Judaeo-Christian respect for th e dig-
nity and value of all persons, and to the law 's traditional protection of each 
individual 's life, in an effort to reestablish the Western pro-life bias which he 
perceives to be slipping through the unravelling "moral fabric of this nation" (4, 
9). 
As in his influential The Patient as Person (1970), Ramsey surveys the medical-
moral scene from a theological vantage point, but acknowledges a diverse 
audience , and anticipates the "convergence" of religious and humanistic out-
looks at the level of special moral problems. An interesting twist is Ramsey 's 
assertion that our Western culture is so imbued with Christian values that a 
theoretical bridge from religious to secular ethics is not in need of construction 
(xiii-xiv). Affirming life as a gift and a trust from the Creator, Ramsey enjoins 
covenant love or agape and steadfast fidelity to persons as constitutive of "care" 
in medical practice (146-147, 161 , 218-219). Reformulations of the author 's 
previously published positions (on abortion, mercy-killing, withholding treatment) 
exhibit a renewed conservatism toward the protection of life, whether born or 
unborn, "wanted" or aborted, normal or abnormal, nondying or dying, competent 
or incompetent. 
The first of the book's two parts deals with ethics at "The First of Life." 
Therein Ramsey criticizes the 1976 United States Supreme Court decision that a 
Missouri statute requiring spousal or parental consent for an abortion was uncon-
stitutional (Planned Parenthood v. Danforth); statutory and institu t ional "con-
science clauses" exempting conscientious objectors from participation in abor-
tions, ostensibly without penalty ; and the Edelin case and its implications for 
responsibilities to aborted fetuses. Central to the section is Ramsey's affirmation 
of the equality principle in abortion as in other medical matters. In his concern 
for the protection of fetal human life, he vehemently renounces the creeping 
"atomistic individualism " (9, 12, 15) which he perceives to be root decisions to 
abort, procedures for securing and performing abortions, and standards of care for 
or disposal of fetuses. 
Roman Catholic medical professionals may be interested to note and evaluate 
Ramsey 's faulting of recent Catholic discussions of "cooperation" in a pluralistic 
society (Catholic Hospital Ethics, a report of a commission of the Catholic Theo-
logical Society of America; arguments of Charles E. Curran about sterilization 
from which Ramsey analogizes, however legitimately, to abortion) as excessively 
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concerned with rights of the individual patient to the detriment of institutional 
protection of the professional m ed ical conscience (84). 
The second section of the book, "The Last of Life , " in part develops and 
revises insights published in The Patient as Person. This half treats of "euthana-
sia," and allowing to die or "only caring" for the dying ; of care for defective 
newborns ; and of the ethica l assumptions and implications of legal landmarks such 
as the Quinlan and Saikewicz cases and the California Natural Death Act. 
Ramsey's primary project is to replace traditional standards for administering or 
withholding treatment, including the classificatory distinction between ord inary 
and extraordinary means , with a " medical indications policy" of care (153-1 55, 
165). He rejects any "q uality of life " assessments and establishes an "objective" 
or "physiological " medical basis for treatment (159, 206). In general, physically 
beneficial treatments should be provided to competent and incompetent, normal 
and abnormal patients alike. The only legitimate distinction is between patients 
who are dying and those who are not. For the person near death , "only caring" or 
"comforting" may become more appropriate than life-sustaining procedures 
(165). 
Ramsey 's main concern in this section is to avoid slipping down the slope 
toward direct involuntary euthanasia, through a policy of "subst ituted judgment" 
whereby death is the impu ted interest of abnOl'mal and incompetent but non-
dying individuals (332). He rejects "qual ity of life" arguments against treatment 
because they might also be employed to justify direct killing; he rejects "substi-
tuted judgments" for non treatment or dea th in the intel'est of the non-dy ing 
patient because such judgments might also be made to justify deaths of the 
abnormal in the interests of others. Ramsey asserts than any decision made for an 
incompetent patient should as a "rule of practice" favor life (165). While this is 
certainly a valid claim , it might still be asked whether Richard McCormick 's 
proposal of relational potential as a minimal quality of life criterion, for allowing 
some viable patients to die, is more meritorious a nd less sinister than Ramsey 
concedes. Certainly McCormick does not mean that our duty to protect life as 
valuable ever ceases, but that what is indicated as genuinely beneficial to the 
patient incapable of relationship may change. Ramsey's proposal of a physical 
standard of benefit and therefore of "medically indicated " treatment may pur-
chase objectivity at the price of a more refined ethical sensit ivity to the needs of 
the most vulnerable claimers of care. 
Need the validity of evaluations of life's quality in t reatment decisions about 
incompetent patients be negated by Ramsey's fear of directing "the edge of the 
wedge" toward involuntary euthanasia? First, it must yet be shown either that 
there is justification for direct killing as well as omitting treatment, or that there is 
no morally relevant distinction between the two acts. Second, if consent by 
proxy is a good mode in which to meet the needs of incompetents, it must be 
shown both that adequate safeguards of their interests cannot be built into the 
decision-making process, and that the social danger of making subst ituted judg-
ments on the basis of worth to others is great enough to justify depriving incom-
petent persons of proxies who will act for their welfare even when that includes 
death. 
Ramsey's own tentative exceptions to the pro-life practice which prohib its 
euthanasia are based on an evaluation of some individuals as not "living pel'sons" 
(e.g., anencephalic infants) and of other persons as "beyond care" (e.g., victims of 
Lesch-Nyhan syndrome), a move perhaps not entirely consistent with his prin-
ciple that medical care (if not life-prolonging treatment) be unceasing (215, 219). 
While Ramsey concedes that such patients might morally be permitted to die or 
even directly be killed, choice of death always remains exceptional and ought 
never evolve into a general practice of euthanasia for specifiable categories of 
patients. 
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Ethics at the Edges of Life is ethical analysis in Ramsey 's cha racter istically 
careful , rigorous, and precise style. While much of it is directed at "opponents" 
past and prese nt, and it is too detailed to serve as an overview of the issues, most 
ethicians , legal scho lars, and medical professionals will appreciate Ramsey 's pains-
taking attention to the complexities of each question he addresses. Ramsey is a 
rare theologian who can reflect and publish rapidly and compete ntly on current 
technical a nd lega l developments, thereby writing not, as he himself allows, "for 
ages to come," but for the possibility of interve ntion in the headlong course of 
events toward them. 
- Lisa Sowle Cahill 
Assistant Professor of Theology 
Boston College 
Issues of life and d eath , law and medicine , ethics and pub lic policy are the 
subject of profound and prolonged debate on the contempora,·y scene. It is w ith a 
ce,·lain sense of excitem e nt then that we find the probing mind of Paul R a msey 
addressing these su bjects. £fhics af the Edge of Life, a series of essays developed 
from the 197 5 Brampton Lectures at Co lum bia Uni ve rs ity, is Ramsey 's vehicl e for 
exp loring the m edica l and lega l inte rsections at what h e labels "the first and t h e 
last of life." 
The fram ewor k is a n interesting one because the last decade has seen an enor-
mous development of lega l and moral problems surro unding birth and death: 
abortion, euthanasia, treatment of defec tive newborns, termination of medical 
care for incompetents, etc. It is to these issues that Ramsey applies his a nalys is in 
the hope, as he puts it , of e ngaging doctors , law yers, ethicists and t h e general 
public in a dialogue of the specific dilemmas posed by these problems . Any hope 
of dia logue, thou gh , quickly evaporates as Ramsey utilizes his relentless logic and 
biting sarcasm to drive a wedge betwee n him and those whom h e seeks to 
infiu e nct'. 
Ramsey's well-known and skillfully argued opposition to abortion is reduced 
here to snide attacks on the logic of the Supreme Court's post- Wade decisions, as 
if merely noting the inconsistenci es, incongruiti es, and inadequacies of t h e opin-
ions will overturn the d ecisions . He reach es the worst of these tendencies in a 
chapter on the £delil1 decision , an aberrant case of a Boston City Hospital doctor 
whose conviction of manslaughter of a viable aborted fetus was overturned (on 
procedural grounds) by the Massac husetts Supreme Judicial Court . 
Tht' court itse lf concluded that the value of the case as precedent was minimal 
because it arose in an " interregnum - a kind of time not likel y to be re peated ," 
i.e., when the Commonwealth had no abortion statute. Even though t h e court 
split three ways and there was no clear rule of law resulting from it, Ramsey 
devoted nearly 50 pages of tedious text to the various opinions. 
In an interesting scenario, Ramsey recreates in story form a conversat ion he 
had with a Massachusetts lawyer fri e nd on the Edelin case and then reveals his 
"feeling a littl e threatened " when the lawyer "presumed to go behind the robes of 
mystery ." The friend sugges ted "th e re may have been an aura surrounding t his 
case which highlighted the wisdom, propriety, and maybe even the necess ity of 
making a final de te rmination at the appell ate leve l to forego further rendering of 
the social fabric by a second tr ial. Perhaps, this was all the more wise , proper , and 
necessary because of South Boston school situation. . Here I stopped hi s soc io-
logical speculat ions." 
The reaction reveals much of Ramsey's fai lu re to understand the judicial 
process. As Robert McClosky reminds us in his insightful Th e A mericGIl Supreme 
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Court: The first lesson to be learned of the Court is that "it is a political inst itu-
tion." To be aware of that fact is to save oneself hours of painstak ing sifting of 
arguments which , in fact , h ave littl e to do with the actual outcom e of th e case. 
In his chapter on e uthanasia, Ramsey calls for t h e scrapping of t h e traditional 
distinction between ordinary /ex traordinary treatments and su bstituting of "a 
m edical indications policy." H e d oes this to avo id what he sees as an increasing 
tendency to uti li ze "a quali ty-of- life" standard . The di fficulty is that his transla-
tion is highly ambiguous, e.g., "a conscious, competent, ' incu rab le' pat ient woul d 
h ave a relative righ t to refuse treatment in the cou rse of shared decis ion-making 
concerning his or her case." Wh at does that mea n? 
One principle pe rvad es all o f R am sey's thinking: the need for an undiminished 
ob ligat ion to sustain life. The problem is t hat Ramsey elevates the princip le into 
an abso lute and thus h as an easy out from what , in fact, are d if ficu lt moral a nd 
m edical dilemmas. He fl ees to his absolute rather than face the agonizing struggle 
Richard McCormick graphicall y presents in hi s now fam ous JAMA artic le on 
defective newborns, " T o Save or Let Die" (July 8, 1974). Ramsey does t h is 
because he is afrai d of t h e sli ppery slope. His reason for never not treati ng severely 
defective newborns is that "to beg in to introduce death as a practice would be o ne 
more step in the eros ion of the m ora l distinction between volu ntary an d involun-
tary euthanasia." Bu t as McCormick notes, with th e development of mode rn 
technology, we must shift the question from "Can we keep this patient a live?" to 
"What kind of a life al'e we sav ing?" Such questions, d espite Ramsey's fears and 
protests , a re irret ri evably "q uality-o f-li fe" judgments and there is n o avo iding 
t he m. 
Along with hi s a rgu m enta tion from absolu tes, Ram sey h as a n irritating te n-
de ncy to push every lega l statem ent to its logical extreme a nd then som e, e.g., he 
would read the Quinlan opi ni o n to m ean that the court could order th e respirator 
tu rned off o ver the pa rents' objections if it determined that Kare n A nn a nd " the 
overwh elming m ajority" would want it off. In doing so, Ramsey forgets Justice 
Oliver We ndell Holmes' admonit ion that "It is ex perience not logic th at is the life 
of t h e law." 
For one who sc ru t in izes lega l cases with exacting care, Ramsey is a decidedly 
poor interpreter of lega l phrases a nd a yet poorer prognosticator of judicial 
rulings. He clearly m isinterprets - or simpl y misunde rstands - so basic a concept 
in t h e law as "substituted judgment " when he wr ites, "Th is means ( in the case of 
incompetents) in treatment d ec isions to use as a nOI'm the treatm e nt offered to 
normal patients" (p . 286 , n. 19). As the Suprem e Judic ial Court's Saihewicz 
opinion m ade cl ear, it m ea ns no such thingl 
R a msey wanted t hat resul t in Saihewicz and so read hi s own des ires into th e 
phrase. He then confid ently predicted , " Substituted judgm ent cannot as such be 
ex te nded to t he Saihewicz case." It was , as readers fam ilial' with t he case know, 
the basis for the Suprem e Judicial Cou rt's unanimous opinion in Saihewicz. Such a 
gri evous misreading of t he court serious ly undel'mines both Ramsey 's cred ibility 
and hi s dispass ioned " legal schola rship." 
Pe rhaps t he clearest insight in to Ramsey 's t hin king is his open admiss ion that 
hi s theology is fashioned from the Reformation e m p h asis on the "total depravity " 
o f man . That Lu thera n emphasis overshadows all other considerations of huma n 
nature. Given the co rru pti on, Ramsey bel ieves we can never trust m e n to behave 
in a "correct" manne r. Instead, h e argues , we mu st re ly o n abso lu te rules and 
rigid ly enforced laws to pI-even t m en from slipping in to their natura l propensity to 
sin. 
His o u t look ex pl ai ns, in part , the constant attacks that appea l' t hroughout t he 
text on judges as ignorant , prosecutors as cowards, docto l's as uninform ed , moral -
ists as misguided , and the public as untl·ustwOl·th y. Of suc h is the vision of a 
se lf- professed "cy nic about th e ethos of present soc iety," whose on ly hope fo r t he 
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world is "the Holy Spirit's power to bring about an earthquake in contemporary 
moral opinion." Understandable though it is, Ramsey 's position is not one that 
commends itself to those who seriously hope to influence and transform society 
rather than merely lament its condition or wait in fear and trembling for God to 
intervene. Moreover, it is hardly the stance of one open to the genuine dialogue 
proposed in the preface. 
We may conclude by quoting from an earlier comment of Richard McCormick: 
"In an excellent book, The Patient as Person, Ramsey's description of the duty of 
caring for the dying is the most beautiful and Christian avai lable." That book , to 
date, has not been improved upon and , hopefully, will continue to overshadow 
this sad exercise in polemics, nit-picking, and intramural sparing. In sum , Ramsey 
still has much to contribute to the ongoing debate in medical:legal ethics, but 
unfortunately, not in this publication which h e promises will be his "last book in 
medical ethics." 
- John J . Paris, S.J. 
Associate Professor of Social Ethics 
Holy Cross College 
TWO VIEWS ON: 
Health Care Ethics 
Benedict M. Ashley, O.P. and Kevin D. O'Rourke, O.P. 
Catholic Hospital Association, 1438 Grand Blvd. , St. Louis, Mo. 63104, 1978. xii 
+ 507 pp, $13.00, soft cover. 
Christian medical practitioners and health care profess ionals stand to benefit 
greatly from this careful and comprehensive study of current m edical-moral and 
bioethical problems written by Fathers Ashley and O'Rourke. Father O ' RoUl'ke is 
the present medical·moral advisor for the Catholic Hospital Association. Father 
Ashley is a professor of moral theology at Aquinas Institute, and was recently 
granted the prestigious Master of Sacred Theology degree from the Dominican 
Order. Both authors are highly skilled theologians, as well as philosoph ers and 
moralists , who have combined their substantial skills to create this comprehensive, 
well organized and well-written study of moral problems in current health care. 
This study thoroughly investigates philosophical, theological and moral aspects of 
bioethical reasoning, abortion, contraception, triage, psychotherapy and pastoral 
care. The primary value of the wOl'k is that it integrates the latest and most 
advanced theological and philosophical developments with moral analyses of prob-
lems in these areas. While it is often difficu lt to distinguish the work of many 
moral theologians from that of bioethicists and medical moralists , the distinctive 
theological character of this work is quite evident. This work is clearly a work of 
moral theology , and it is wl'itten for the ex plicit purpose of providing guidelines 
for Christian health care . 
Of significant value in this work is the notion of human totality and integrity, 
for this principle makes it possibl e to deduce the grounds for the c laim of human 
persons to an a bsolute and unconditional right to life. The integrity of the human 
person rests upon a capacity for integrating ordel's of mean ing, logic and value for 
the purposes of generating richer and more complex orders. The class of pel·sons is 
the only class possessing this active capability of synth es is and integration for that 
purpose. This enables persons to actualize meanings a nd values that are morally 
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